|
In labour economics, Shapiro–Stiglitz theory of efficiency wages (or Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage model 〔W. Sjostrom, Job Security in an Efficiency Wage Model, Journal of Macroeconomics, Winter 1993, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 183-187〕) is an economic theory of wages and unemployment in labour market equilibrium. It provides a technical description of why wages are unlikely to fall and how involuntary unemployment appears. This theory was first developed by Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz.〔C. Shapiro and J.E. Stiglitz, The American Economic Review, vol 74, 3, pp 433-444 (1984)〕 〔J.L. Yellen, The American Economic Review, vol 74, 2, pp 200-205 (1984)〕 ==Introduction== When full employment is achieved, if a worker is sacked, he automatically finds his next job soon. In the circumstances, he does not need to exert his effort in his job, and thus full employment necessarily motivates a worker to shirk provided that he is happy with loafing on the job.〔 Since shirking makes a firm's productivity decline, the firm needs to offer its workers higher wages to eliminate shirking. Then all firms try to eliminate shirking, which pushes up average wages and decreases employment. Hence nominal wages tend to display downward rigidity. In equilibrium, all firms pay the same wage above market clearing, and unemployment makes job loss costly, and so unemployment serves as a worker-discipline device.〔 A jobless person cannot convince an employer that he works at a wage lower than the equilibrium wage, because the owner worries that shirking occurs after he is hired. As a result, his unemployment becomes involuntary. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Shapiro–Stiglitz theory」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|